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I appreciate this opportunity to discuss aspects of quantitative easing
(QE)withsomeformercentralbankcolleaguesonthispanel.Today’stopic
is monetary policy in a low‐interest‐rate environment. For the Federal
Reserve,whichwillbemymainfocus,thatmeansQEbecausethefederal
funds rate has already been effectively brought to zero. My presentation
today will have three parts. First, I will discuss the channels through
which QE works, because that sets up a basis to evaluate the policy. Sec-
ond,andwhatmaysoundironic,IwillexplainwhyQEishardtoquantify.
That will say something about the ways central banks operate and about
the current state of economics and finance. Finally, I shall discuss the risks
associated with QE. This will highlight the importance of having an exit
strategy. In that regard, this discussion should not be viewed as relevant
exclusivelytotheFederalReserve.Anycentralbankconfidentinitsability
to exit might be more willing to enter a period of very low interest rates.
I. QE, QED
Quantitative easing holds that the size and composition of the central
bank’s balance sheet influences financial markets and the economy over
and beyond the level of the policy rate. One consequence of this defini-
tion is that policy does not necessarily run out of ammunition at the
zero bound. That is, the central bank can still manipulate its balance
sheet even as its policy rate is pinned at zero. This definition also im-
plies that QE is not just about the level of reserves. The level of reserves
is one portion of a central bank's balance sheet, but other liabilities and
the size and composition of its assets can also influence the macro econ-
omy. In addition, this definition implies that QE can be undertaken
at a nonzero policy interest rate. This is relevant both for the central
banks that have not already put the pedal fully to the metal, such as
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ning now how to unwind policy stimulus.
Quantitative easingpotentially works on both sides of acentral bank’s
balance sheet in the manner described by Bernanke and Reinhart (2004).
1. The large provision of reserves may induce banks to make use of idle
balances, which is the traditional money multiplier effect. Even as the
policy rate is pushed to zero, reserves can expand, potentially mas-
sively, providing banks the wherewithal to support deposit creation,
if they are so inclined.
2. The overprovision of reserves also could help convince market par-
ticipants that the policy interest rate will be low for a long time. This is
known as the policy duration effect. This simply recognizes that the big-
ger is the balance sheet, the longer it will likely take to shrink (in the
manner described by Auerbach and Obstfeld [2004]).
3. On the asset side, the accumulation of portfolio holdings might influ-
ence relative spreads and the function of markets, which is an asset substi-
tution effect (in the manner of Tobin [1970]).
4. A central bank holding more assets, particularly those that have
higher returns than typical and importantly above the remuneration
on deposits, should generate additional income. This central bank profit
may encourage the government to spend more or to cut taxes, which is
known as creating fiscal space.
Asanaside,FederalReserveofficialsapparentlyhadastabatrebrand-
ing QE. The Fed started QE in October 2008, as seen in figure 1a as the
massive increase in reserves. That provision of liquidity drove the funds
rate effectively to zero (fig. 1b), even as the official target was still 1%.
Despiteboththeevidenceinquantitiesandprices,officialsseemedreluc-
tant to describe their policy as QE.
1 It might have been because QE was
thought to describe the narrow provision of reserves. More likely, I
believe, is that the Fed expanded its balance sheet as its microeconomic
programs ballooned, so it saw this as an extension of its credit policies.
The Fed did not formally embrace QE for macroeconomic reasons until
mid‐December, when the Federal Open Market Committee officially
pushed its target rate to 0%–0.25%.
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II. Quantifying QE
My second topic is the ongoing crisis and the quantification of QE. This
is not just a crisis in global financial markets and economies; it is also a
Panel Discussion 347crisis in economics and finance. The models we have been using do not
adequately capture QE. Modern macroeconomic models used to eval-
uate policy have three main features. First, they net across entities and
describe the behavior of the representative agent. Thus, gross positions
do not matter. Second, quantitative models tend to assume arbitrage
across markets. This means that a small set of financial market prices,
perhaps even a single one, can describe the whole spectrum of financial
Fig. 1. a, Reserve balances at the Federal Reserve. b, Effective federal funds rate.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
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policy making to the control of the short‐term interest rate.
As a consequence, the evaluation of QE has thus far focused on what
can be explained internally in these models, what can be imposed from
the outside on these models, and what can be observed in a model‐free
manner.
Internal to models. To be a bit more specific, the policy duration effect
is the main channel that can be measured internally to most models. If
interest rates are expected to stay pinned at zero for longer than pre-
viously expected, aresearchercan show howthat surprise playsthrough
t h ey i e l dc u r v ea n di n f l u e n c e st h ee c o n o m y .M o s to ft h ew o r ko nt h e
Bank of Japan experience has emphasized this policy duration effect
(as discussed in Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack [2004]).
External to models. The same models can be used in an ad hoc manner
to consider the effects of external forces. For instance, what happens if a
particular relative spread widens? “Ad‐factoring” one of the equations
explaining spending proxies this event, much in the manner
decried by Sims (1980) almost 30 years ago. Implicit in that implemen-
tation of a shock is the view that the cost of intermediation rises in a
crisis, and that is probably right. More problematic is the incidence of
the shock. How those higher costs are passed along in terms of rates
and quantities—that is, the cost and availability of funds—depends
on the structure of the industry. In Reinhart and Reinhart (1999), for
instance, the effects of an increase in reserve requirements in a small
open economy are shown to depend on whether banks have market
power in deposit creation or lending.
Event studies. Finally, event studies around policy announcements
quantify policy effects outside any one particular model (exercises that
are also considered in Bernanke et al. [2004]). The problem with event
studies, of course, is the questions that remain implicit. How much of
the announcement was expected? How effectively was the policy ex-
plained? What happened outside the window? Indeed, the tyranny of
event studies tends to focus attention on what central banks do because
the reaction can be measured in a narrow window. Less well under-
stood, then, is the consequence of policy inaction, or the dog that did
not bark, which plays out at a vague and hard‐to‐measure pace.
This perspective helps to explain the macro model U.S. policy makers
must have in the recesses of their minds. In particular, their model must
allow some role for imperfect asset substitutability. That is the only way
that purchasing Treasury securities, as the Fed has done, would be
expected to lower private spreads. Bank profits must also enter that
Panel Discussion 349model. The stress tests of the banking system emphasized flow profits
ratherthanlegacylosses.
3Ifitwasimportanttoshiftthefocusoffinancial
market participants to ongoing profits, implicitly profits must matter.
Finally, officials must hold the view that central bank profits matter. If
not, we wouldnot hear all this talkabout concernsover potentiallosses.
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III. Risks Associated with QE
Given the venue for this conference, here on the Mediterranean island
from which Aphrodite emerged from the sea, it is reasonable to ask two
fundamental questions found in the classics. Those questions concern
risks associated with QE.
First, does QE risk flying too close to the sun, in the manner of
Icarus? Policy makers and outside observers often voice reservations
about the longer‐term consequences of QE. There seems to be a fear that
policy will be decidedly asymmetric. Reluctantly removing massive ac-
commodation that was put in place aggressively might risk longer‐term
inflation prospects. Implicit in this view is a dark interpretation of the
political economy and a fear that inflation expectations are changeable.
Second, and in contrast to the threat from the sun, is not resorting to
QE living fearfully in the shade? In that regard, consider the words of
Aristophanes in his play The Wasps. He wrote, “Why do we delay to let
loose that fury, that is so terrible, when our nests are attacked?”
5 This
aptly summarizes a threat to a central bank’s legitimacy from another
direction: What would happen if it were seen as not using the policy
tools at its disposal in a time of great risk to society?
When considering the risks of QE, it is important to remember that
the tools that allow the expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet are
not inherently asymmetric. Mechanically, the central bank can shrink its
balance sheet just as fast as it was expanded. Rather, the question is
about the willingness of the central bank to be symmetrically aggres-
sive, not the ability. In that regard, QE is probably most effective when
there is a well‐defined exit strategy. The anchoring of inflation expecta-
tions in the long run at an appropriate level gives policy makers leeway
to be aggressive in the short run.
Some comfort can be taken from the fact that the Bank of Japan was
able to unwind its balance sheet relatively quickly. In five remarkable
months in 2006, the Bank of Japan shrank total assets by about a fifth.
Asseeninfigure2,thatcontractioncamemostlyfromitsportfolioofgov-
ernment securities. The short average maturity of that portfolio allowed
the asset stock to contract by merely rolling off maturing obligations.
Reinhart 350While this has been done before, there are reasons to be concerned
about the Federal Reserve’s willingness to head for the exit. There are
four sources of concern. First, policy makers might be unwilling to test
the resilience of markets. They might easily convince themselves that the
improvement in markets and the economy is due to the massive size of
the Fed’s balance sheet. While financial markets and the economy might
be better, they might not be strong enough to withstand the removal of
that accommodation. A regular tendency over time and across countries
is that policy rates move asymmetrically. Policy rates tend to decline
q u i c k l ya n di n c r e a s es l o w l y .T h i si sr e f e r r e dt oa sg o i n gu pb yt h e
escalator and down by the elevator.
6 If policy rates are asymmetric
even though there is no obvious cost to adjustment, we should not
be surprised to find that changes in the balance sheet are similarly
asymmetric.
Second, some long‐lived assets on the Fed’s balance sheet might no
longer have markets when the time comes for the Fed to want to sell
them. This mostly holds for the assets in the special purpose vehicles
and the potential purchase of legacy securities as part of the Treasury’s
rescue plan.
7
Third, the Treasury has funded a portion of some Fed programs by
providing a first‐loss tranche. If the Treasury was present at the crea-
tion, does it also have to be amenable at the closure?
Fourth, political pressures might be intense. The Fed has been able to
play a forceful role in affecting private credit markets. The Congress
Fig. 2. Assets of the Bank of Japan
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interfere with those decisions going forward.
MypreferredsolutionisnottoletthepossibilitythattheFedmightfail
to do the right thing in the future prevent it from doing the right thing
now. As long as resource slack is considerable and deflation is a palpable
threat,therightthingistokeeptheFed'sbalancesheetmassive.Atalater
date, the Fed will have to be forceful in exiting that position. Investors
can be provided reassurance now by putting mechanisms in place that
force good behavior in the future. Three items come to mind. First, the
Fed could be given a formal inflation goal by the Congress. That would
help anchor inflation expectations and prove that the Congress will
n o tb er e c a l c i t r a n ta tal a t e rd a t e .
8 Second, the Fed could change its
regulations to harden the floor on deposit rates. Back in November
and December of 2008, the federal funds rate often traded below the
depositrate.Thatis,somemarketparticipantswerewillingtolendfunds
into the marketfor alowerrate thanthey could receive ondeposits atthe
Federal Reserve. The reason behind this phenomenon is that not every
reserve holder receives interest on reserves. That can be changed. Third,
a term limit on holding private credit risk funded with reserves would
force the Federal Reserve to either seek funding from the Treasury or to
sell those assets.
IV. Conclusion
Central banks in many countries are in uncharted waters. Their task is
made more difficult by the lack of tools provided by the economics and
finance professions. The experience of 2008 and probably the next few
years will be challenging. But it will also enrich our understanding of
how monetary policy and economies work.
Endnotes
This paper was prepared for a panel discussion at the 2009 NBER International Semi-
nar on Macroeconomics in Lemesol, Cyprus.
1. Note, e.g., that Chairman Bernanke’s testimony on monetary policy and the outlook
on October 20, 2008, was silent on the level of reserves and the federal funds rate, at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20081020a.htm.
2. This is noted in the statement of the Federal Open Market Committee at the conclu-
sion of its year‐end meeting on December 16, 2008, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm.
3. The stress tests are described at http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg91.html.
4. This is not an area the academic profession has directed much attention toward in
the past two decades. For an earlier generation, including Metzler and Mundell, the
treatment of central bank profits was an important mechanism in the transmission
mechanism, as is shown rigorously in Obstfeld (1982).
Reinhart 3525. The text of the play can be found at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristophanes/wasps
.html.
6. For example, Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn made this observation in a speech,
“Monetary Policy over Fifty Years,” at a conference to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the
Deutsche Bundesbank in Frankfurt, Germany, on September 21, 2007, at http://www
.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20070921a.htm.
7. In that regard, the Fed has already reached an accord with the Treasury for it to
assume those special purpose vehicle assets when the time comes.
8. This is an initiative discussed by Bernanke et al. (2001), among others.
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